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IMMIGRATION AND SOCIAL BENEFITS IN A MEDITERRANEAN 
WELFARE STATE: THE CASE OF SPAIN 
 




The aim of this paper is to explore the impact of immigration on the Spanish Welfare 
State nowadays. Using two different household surveys, both the reception of state cash 
transfers and the use of public health care insurance by nationals and immigrants are 
analysed. Controlling by observable socio-demographic characteristics, we find that 
immigrants receive fewer cash transfers than locals and do not exhibit a statistically 
significant higher use of health care services than nationals. The nature of the Spanish 
Welfare State compared to its European correlates and the age composition of the 
immigrant population, concentrated in active age, can help to explain these findings. 




From a historical point of view, nowadays immigration rates do not stand 
comparison to the flows corresponding to the massive migration wave that took place, 
in a context of almost free movement of people, from the mid 1850’s to the beginning 
of World War I (Hatton and Williamson, 2005). However, the lower economic growth 
rates of the receiving countries, their higher population density, and the reorientation of 
migration towards the developed countries have made migration a highly visible and 
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debatable issue nowadays.2 According to the Eurobarometer 65 (2007), immigration is 
considered in the EU-15 the fourth most important issue of concern faced by the 
member states (right after unemployment, crime, and the economic situation). At the 
same time, less than half of EU-15 citizens (42%) consider immigrants contribute a 
great deal to their countries. In Spain, in 2006, for the first time immigration figured as 
the most important problem faced by the country (59% of answers), well above 
unemployment (42%) and housing (21%).3 
 This general concern about the impact of immigration on Spanish society shows 
in three different dimensions: the impact of immigration on the labour market, potential 
problems of integration (including delinquency, etc.) and the implications of 
immigration for the public sector’s budget. This paper intends to shed light upon a very 
specific issue related to the third dimension: the direct impact of immigration on the 
Spanish Welfare State. It comprises two different dimensions: state cash transfers and 
health care expenditure. Though there is a long tradition of studies on the implications 
of immigration for welfare systems, most of them focus on consolidated welfare 
regimes and consolidated migration communities. Apart from the attitudes towards 
immigration mentioned above, the case studied in this paper is different for two reasons. 
First, in Spain immigration is a very recent phenomenon, particularly interesting in a 
country that was traditionally an emigrant nation. Second, because of historical reasons, 
including the late democratization of the country, the Spanish Welfare State was 
developed comparatively late (in the 1970s) and is still much weaker than most of their 
European correlates. These two characteristics make the Spanish case an interesting 
case study. The hypothesis to be tested is whether immigrants receive more or fewer 
social benefits than locals and whether the differences, when existing, can be fully 
explained by observable characteristics. 
In order to accomplish this aim, the paper is organized in five sections as 
follows. Firstly, the main literature relating to immigration and the Welfare State is 
briefly reviewed. In the second section, some stylized facts about the Spanish Welfare 
State and Spanish immigration are offered to allow the reader to understand the 
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specificity of the case analysed. The third part deals briefly with the main characteristics 
of the databases used in this work. In the fourth place, the methodology and the main 
results of the analysis are presented. Last, section five summarizes the main conclusions 
obtained. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Literature documenting the implications of immigration for the sustainability of 
the Welfare State of the receiving countries follows five different perspectives. From a 
theoretical perspective, some scholars (Gilens, 1999; Alesina and Glaesser, 2004; 
Banting and Kymlicka, 2006) have investigated whether the decrease in cultural and 
ethnical homogeneity resulting from immigration could weaken the popularity of the 
Welfare State or at least of some of its redistributive programs. From a demographic 
perspective, it has been argued that immigration could contribute to solve, at least 
partially, the negative implications for the Welfare State of an increasingly older 
population and the burden derived from it in terms of growing pension expenditure 
(Krieger, 2005; Blake and Mayhew, 2006). In demographically mature countries, it is 
argued that, immigrants, being young, would reduce, at least temporarily, the rate of 
increase of the dependency rate. From a more mundane, but still general approach, other 
researchers have tried to evaluate the overall economic impact of immigration on the 
receiving country, often estimating what is known as the “immigrant surplus”.4 The 
third approach limits itself to the analysis of the direct budgetary implications of 
immigration, estimating the effect of the contribution of immigrants to public sector 
income through taxes and their contribution to expenditures through their use of the 
different public services and transfer programs. For example, according to Ekberg 
(1999), the contribution of immigrants to the Swedish sector was positive (around 1-2% 
of GDP) in the decades of full employment (1950-70), levelling in the 1980s and 
turning negative nowadays owing to the increase of immigrants’ unemployment rates 
(around 2%). Ulrich’s study for Germany arrives at different conclusions, estimating a 
slightly positive impact explained by the younger age structure of the immigrant 
population (Ulrich, 1994). The conclusion of Wadensjö and Gerdes (2004) for five 
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different immigrant communities in Germany ( from Iran, Lebanon, Turkey, Poland and 
Yugoslavia) is partially different as they estimate a negative impact for the first 
generation and a positive impact in the case of the last two groups for the second 
generation. Last, Straubhaar and Weber (1994) estimate that foreign residents in 
Switzerland are most likely to be net contributors to the government budget. The works 
for Spain are basically limited to the analysis of Collado, Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Valera 
(2004), who, based on ad hoc assumptions on payment of taxes and take-up rates of 
social benefits by immigrants, determined the long-term impact of immigration on 
public budget.5 Logically, their results are influenced to a large extent by the 
assumptions made and the demographic composition of immigrant population. 
The last approach, the one we follow in this paper, is less ambitious and only 
focuses on the expenditure side of the public sector. The purpose is to analyse whether 
immigrants have a specific behaviour in relation to social protection once we account 
for their socio-economic characteristics. There are many examples of this strategy in the 
relevant literature. For example, Borjas and Trejos (1991) found that take-up rates of 
welfare benefits of immigrant households were not significantly different to those of 
similar native ones. According to Bird et al. (1999), in Germany higher take-up of 
social benefits by immigrants were fully explained by socio-demographic 
characteristics. Hansen and Lofstrom (2003), whose work was focused on Sweden from 
1990 to 1996, showed that immigrants used welfare to a greater extent than nationals, 
even when controlling for household characteristics. Bengtsson and Scott (2006), also 
for Sweden, reached similar conclusions, in this case referring to the period 1982-91 
and limited to sickness benefits. In contrast, Winkelmann (2002), for Switzerland, 
concluded that the differences in health care use of female migrants (higher use rates) 
tended to be no larger than those observed between Swiss citizens living in different 
cantons of the country.  
Also worth mentioning is the comparative study by Brücker et al. (2002), who 
analysed the perception of the main state cash transfers (unemployment benefits, 
pensions and family benefits) by migrants and natives in several European countries. 
The main drawback of this work is that, because of its reduced sample size, the database 
on which the analysis is based, the European Community Household Panel 1994, 
                                                 
5 There is also a version of this work for a Spanish region, Andalusia (García Pérez, Osuna and Vera, 
2007). 
 4
comprises very few observations (fewer than 20 in some cases) of non-EU citizens in 
countries like Spain or Italy. The results obtained were mixed. Regarding 
unemployment benefits, while the authors found that being an immigrant had a positive 
impact on unemployment benefit dependency in some countries (Denmark, the 
Netherlands, France, Austria and Finland), the country of birth had no significant effect 
in others (Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece and Spain). With relation to pensions, 
owing to the small number of observations only four countries were analysed (Austria, 
Greece, France and Belgium), and no residual effect of immigrant status was found. 
Finally, the probability of receiving family benefits was higher for immigrants in Spain 
and France, lower in the United Kingdom and non-significant in the rest of cases. 
Finally, García, González and Saez (2007) studied the use of health care services in a 
Spanish region (Catalonia) in 1994 and 2002 and found that the immigrant population 
used public health care services to a lesser extent than the locals. However, apart from 
being limited to a very particular Spanish region, this work did not control for 
demographic and economic characteristics.6 
 Our work, when controlling for characteristics, tries to evaluate whether 
immigrants receive more or fewer welfare benefits and public health care than nationals. 
Although the comparative study by Brücker et al. (2002) represents a first attempt to do 
so with relation to cash transfers, as mentioned above, the results reported for Spain can 
hardly be considered representative because of the few observations available for this 
country in the ECHP. The aim of this paper is to overcome some of these shortcomings 
faced by the aforementioned authors, since we explore the reception of state cash 
transfers from the most national recent household survey, the European Union Social 
Indicators on Living Conditions 2005 (EU-SILC 2005) and the use of health care 
services from the last wave of the Spanish Health Survey (SHS 2003). Both databases 
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3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF IMMIGRATION AND THE WELFARE STATE IN SPAIN 
3.1. Spanish immigration in historical perspective 
 
Until recently, Spain was a country of emigrants. Three decades ago, at the 
height of its intensity, Spain had up to 3 million of workers abroad (from a population 
of 34 million) and around 10% of imports could be financed with their remittances 
(Oporto del Olmo, 1992). The impact of the economic crisis of 1973 on the host 
countries, and the modernization and development of the Spanish economy since then 
has greatly reduced, almost eliminated, the emigration of Spanish workers abroad, even 
after joining the EU in 1986. On the receiving side, a decade ago Spain was one of the 
countries of the EU with a lower proportion of immigrants (1%). In sharp contrast with 
these facts, according to census data, in the last few years Spain has witnessed a 
gargantuan increase in the number of immigrants, dwarfing all expectations. In less than 
a decade the percentage of immigrants in Spain increased from 1.4 to 9.5%.7 In fact, in 
the context of the EU only Greece experienced a higher increase (6.7 points from 1990 
to 2004) and only Ireland (with 4.8) came anywhere close (Eurostat, 2006).8 
According to Census data, non-EU-25 born individuals make up more than two 
thirds of immigrants in Spain. The bulk of them (48.5%) come from Latin America, 
mostly from Ecuador, Colombia and Argentina. Africans (with 22.9%) are the second 
major group (mostly Moroccans), while European non-EU-25 citizens (mostly 
Romanians) form the third major group (adding another 21.1%). Finally, nearly 6.5% of 
the immigrants come from Asia.9 
 
3.2. Institutional features of the Spanish Welfare State 
 
Spain is one of the countries in the EU-15 with lower social spending as a 
percentage of GDP. In 2004, public social expenditure as a percentage of the GDP was 
20%, compared to 27.6% in the EU-15. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
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9 See http://www.ine.es/inebase/cgi/um?M=%2Ft20%2Fe245&O=inebase&N=&L for Spanish Census 
data. 
 6
offer an account of the factors behind the comparatively low development of the 
Spanish Welfare State, it is important to notice that this lower level of social protection 
can only be partially explained by the lower GDP per capita of the country (figure 1). 
The same is valid for the dependency rate, another key element in explaining social 
expenditure, as the Spanish dependency rate is similar to the average (25.3% compared 
to 25.9%). 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
This lower level of protection characteristic of the Spanish Welfare State is 
present in all the rubrics of social protection but one: unemployment protection, because 
of the historically higher level of unemployment in Spain (figure 2). When comparing 
the average general social protection gap (Spanish relative expenditure is 72% of EU-15 
relative expenditure) with the gap in the different categories of social expenditure, the 
conclusion is clear: the gap is much higher than warranted by the overall difference in 
relative social expenditure in four categories (family and children, housing, survivors, 
and social exclusion), to be exact, some of the programs most directly targeted to 
populations with low income, i.e., means-tested benefits.  
It should be mentioned that old age and survivors’ benefits accounted for more 
than 40% of total expenditure on social protection and the Spanish pension system is 
mostly based on contributory principles, since, apart from minimum benefits, 
redistribution is limited to non-contributory pensions, which comprise roughly 0.2% of 
the Spanish GDP. 
Regarding health care, several remarks are also required.10 The Spanish National 
Health Care System was created in the mid-eighties from the (insurance-oriented) social 
security health services. It has a regional organizational structure and coverage is almost 
universal (99.5%, only some non-salaried and high income workers are not obliged to 
join the National Health System). It is mainly financed by taxes and, excepting doctors’ 
prescriptions, all health services are free at the point of use, although it is important to 
note that there is a system of gate-keepers, that is, in order to visit the specialist 
                                                 
10 See Durán, Lara and van Waveren (2006) for details. 
 7
individuals have to be referred by their general practitioner. Finally, it is worth 
mentioning that even illegal immigrants are also entitled to public health care. 
Summing up, Spain has clearly a low profile Welfare State, with the second 
lowest level of protection (after Ireland) of the EU-15. Furthermore, this lower level of 
development of the welfare state cannot be fully explained by its lower GDP per capita. 
In fact, relative social expenditure in Spain is similar to Poland, a country with half its 
GDP per capita in 2004. 
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
4. DATABASES 
 
As mentioned, the data sources for analysing social benefits and health care are 
two different household surveys: the European Union Social Indicators and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) survey for the year 2005 and the National Health Survey (NHS) 
for the year 2003. The EU-SILC 2005 is used to analyse reception of cash transfers by 
immigrants and locals. It follows the common rules regarding sampling design and 
other features present in modern household surveys.11 The EU-SILC 2005 has two 
important advantages over previous databases. Firstly, it includes data on income and 
social inclusion referring to nationals and immigrants for 2004, when immigration in 
Spain was already very important. In second place, the size of the EU-SILC has 
increased considerably with regard to the ECHP and surveys more than 20,000 
households, including around 500 headed by individuals born outside of the EU.  
 The NHS 2003 represents the most relevant database for analysing issues related 
to health status, health habits and use of health care services. Apart from the much older 
Family Budget Survey carried out in 1990-1991, the NHS is the only source for 
analysing issues related to access to health services and the allocation of public health 
expenditure. It includes around 700 observations of non-EU citizens. The NHS presents, 
however, many imperfections. It does not contain information about the health care 
expenditure received by each individual and only comprises information about the 
yearly number of visits to the general practitioner and specialists, days of hospitalization 
and emergency room visits.  
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In addition, we only know who financed a health care service in the case of the 
last utilization for each category, which means around 70% of total services delivered. 
These problems are not new in the literature and some scholars like Abásolo (1998) and 
Urbanos (2000) offer some simple procedures to deal with these difficulties, which we 
have approximately followed here. In order to solve this problem we calculated the 
average proportion of publicly financed visits and days of hospitalization by immigrant 
status and type of coverage. We then applied these values to the 30% of services whose 
payer is unknown.12 Lastly, once the number of publicly financed visits and days of 
hospitalization has been derived, it is possible to impute a value for public health 
expenditure to each person using the average cost of the different services provided by 
the National Health System (visits to the general practitioner and the specialist, days of 
hospitalization and emergency room visits). This information has been estimated from 
the Ramón y Cajal Hospital 2004 Annual Report, one of the most important Spanish 
hospitals, situated in Madrid, and the public price list of medical services of one of the 
Spanish autonomous regions (Law of Public Fees of the Generalitat Valenciana of 
2005).13 It should be noted that because of these limitations of the database, all health 
services within each category are valued at the same rate, although there is evidence to 
believe that immigrants are treated by pathologies that are less costly for the health 
system (Salazar et al., 2003; López Vélez, 2006).14 
Another problem of this survey is the high non-response rate for household 
income (more than half of the values are missing). With a view to solving this, we 
follow the procedure used by Urbanos (2000) and Álvarez (2001), using a different 
household survey (the Family Budget Survey 1990-1991) to estimate household 
income. For this purpose, we combine the NHS 2003 and the EU-SILC 2004, which is 
                                                 
12 Abásolo (1998) and Urbanos (2000) only used total average values. We consider that it is better to 
distinguish between immigrants and locals and that there may be important differences between those 
with only public health insurance and those with private coverage. 
13 Unfortunately, because of the decentralization process of the National Health System, since 1990 there 
is no central source of information on the average cost of different medical services on a nation-wide 
scale (personal communication from the Ministry of Health to the authors). Other researchers, like 
Abásolo (1998) and Urbanos (2000), have opted for using the latest data available on a national basis, 
which dates from 1990. 
14 For example, in 2005 15% of births in Spain were from a foreign mother. While the average cost of 
giving birth is 1,244€ (Cots and Castells, 2004), the average cost of a coronary bypass without PTCA 
(Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty) with cardiac catheterization, a pathology most 
frequently treated in the case of natives, is 13.431€ (Spanish Royal Decree Law 1207/2006 on the 
regulation of the Health Cohesion Fund) . 
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very similar to EU-SILC 2005 and includes information on household income in 
2003.15 Finally, it is worth mentioning that some civil servants in Spain can opt between 
the National Health System and private health services funded by the state. Since in the 
NHS there are serious difficulties to identify private services publicly funded from 
private services paid by individuals, those civil servants opting for private services were 
removed from the sample. 
One relevant decision to be made ex ante the empirical analysis is to define who 
is an immigrant. In principle, one could choose between two alternatives: country of 
birth and nationality. The existence of different naturalization rules according to the 
country of origin (fewer years of residence for citizens from Latin American countries, 
for example) makes us favour the former criterion. Furthermore, the country of birth 
criterion is a common choice followed in other studies (Brücker et al., 2002; Bird et al., 
1999; Hansen and Lofstrom, 2003; Anastassova and Paligorova, 2006). Therefore, we 
adopt the criterion of country of birth to define immigrant status in the analysis from 
EU-SILC. However, as in the NHS only information on citizenship is available, we 
followed the nationality criterion when working with this second database. 
Another important point to address is whether to consider all foreign born 
population as immigrants. According to the local perception, one should consider as 
immigrants people born outside EU-15, a choice made for example, by Brücker et al. 
(2002). Unfortunately, both the EU-SILC 2005 and the NHS 2003 contain little 
information about the specific country of immigrants and it is only possible to 
distinguish between Spanish, EU-citizens (i.e., from a country belonging to the EU-25), 
other Europeans and people from other foreign countries. Therefore, we have defined 
nationals as people born in Spain or the present EU-25 and immigrants as people whose 
country of birth is outside of the EU. Fortunately, this criterion, although not the 
optimum, does not exclude Romanians or Bulgarians, two very important groups among 
immigrant workers according to Census data. 
A final remark to be made has to do with our decision, when working with 
household data, of considering that the immigrant or the native status of a household is 
                                                 
15 The procedure followed here basically consists in estimating by OLS the determinants of log household 
income from the EU-SILC 2004 using a set of variables also present in the NHS 2003. The estimated 
coefficients are then used to predict and impute log income of households in the NHS 2003. All these 
calculations are available on request.  
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determined by its head, as it is commonly assumed in the literature (Borjas and Trejo, 
1991; Hansen and Lofstrom, 2003; Anastassova and Paligorova, 2006). 
 
5. IMMIGRANTS AND THE WELFARE STATE 
5.1. Social transfers in cash 
 
The take-up of cash benefits by immigrants versus locals is the obvious starting 
point in the discussion on the Welfare State implications of immigration. A first glance 
at take-up rates for the different social benefits available in Spain shows that a lower 
proportion of immigrants than nationals receive transfers (Table 1). However, if 
pensions are excluded, there is no statistical difference in take-up rates between both 
population groups. Considering the transfers individually, significant differences in the 
reception of benefits can be found only in pensions and sickness benefits, with a higher 
percentage of recipient households among local population. Regarding the rest of the 
benefits, although the proportion of immigrant households receiving some transfers 
(unemployment benefits, family assistance, social assistance and housing) is higher than 
among locals, the percentages are not statistically different. The low proportion of 
households (among both groups) receiving any social transfer apart from unemployment 
benefits and pensions can be observed. With relation to the average transfer received by 
households, a similar pattern arises.  
In order to test to what extent the recorded differences between locals and 
immigrants in the receiving of social benefits are related to differences in the personal 
and occupational characteristics of both groups, we carry out several different 
econometric analyses. A detailed description of the variables considered in them is 
presented in Table A1 in Annex I. In the first place, we focus our attention on total 
social cash transfers, including and excluding pensions. This analysis is carried out at a 
household level, since most of these kinds of benefits are assigned on a household basis. 
Secondly, we analyse take-up rates for the two most important welfare programs in 
Spain: unemployment benefits and pensions. This second exercise is performed at an 
individual level and only people aged 16 or more are included.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
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As mentioned, the first step is to determine whether being an immigrant is a 
factor contributing, ceteris paribus, towards receiving cash transfers. With this aim, we 
estimate a tobit model, since social income (transfers received by each household) is a 
continuous variable with a high proportion of zero values. The use of hurdle or two-part 
models is not appropriate in this case since a household receiving 1 euro from social 
transfers is not essentially different from another one not receiving social transfers at all. 
Furthermore, if we considered health or education expenditures along with social 
transfers, there would probably not be any zero values, so we are not really working 
with a model with two variables (participation in the program and size of the transfer 
received). Letting yi be a continuous variable denoting social benefits received by 
household I, the tobit model can be expressed as 
 
*max(0, )iy = iy      [1] 
 
where *iy  is a latent variable generated by the following process: 
 
*




2| (0,i iu X N )σ∼      [3] 
 
Xi denotes a vector of observable socio-demographic characteristics of household 
i, including immigrant status, household size, household size squared, number of 
children in the household, and sex, age, marital status, education and main activity of 
household head. β is a vector of coefficients for each characteristic. We present average 
characteristics by household for welfare participation in Table 2. The results of these 
econometric exercises are showed in Tables 3 and 4. It can be observed that, even after 
controlling for several household and household head characteristics, being an 
immigrant household has a negative effect on cash transfers received (Table 3). If 
pensions are excluded from computed social income, once we control for observable 
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characteristics, the results found are very similar (table 4). These outcomes, like the 
ones reported above, may be explained by the non-universal nature of most Spanish 
social transfers and the important role played in the Spanish Welfare State by benefits 
related to the employment record of the beneficiary, like pensions and unemployment 
insurance. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
TABLE 3 HERE 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
In the second step to studying social transfers in Spain, that is, analysing the 
take-up rates for the most important social programs, we closely follow the work of 
Brücker et al. (2002). By formulating a probit model, we aim to determine if being a 
non-EU citizen influences the probability of receiving unemployment benefits or 
pensions. The dependent variable is a binary variable, Pi, which adopts value 1 for 
individuals receiving unemployment benefits/pensions and value 0 otherwise. The 
model can be described as: 
 
( )         1, 2,...,  i iP X i Nβ= Φ ∀ =     [4] 
 
where Φ(.) is the normal cumulative density function, i is subscript that denotes the ith 
individual, Xi is a vector of observable socio-demographic characteristics of each 
individual, including immigrant status, household size, household size squared, number 
of children in the household, sex, age, marital status, education and main activity and β 
is a vector of coefficients for each characteristic. Table 5 shows the main descriptive 
statistics of variables used in the regression and econometric results are presented in 
Tables 6 and 7. Results are not surprising and agree with those reported above. While 
immigrant status is not relevant in explaining the reception of unemployment benefits, 
the probability of receiving pensions is lower for non-EU citizens, even after controlling 
by observable characteristics. Although eligibility for pension benefits mainly depends 
on age, portability problems (i.e., people who work for a long time outside Spain) can 
also help to explain this residual effect. 
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 TABLE 5 HERE 
TABLE 6 HERE 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 
5.2. Public health expenditure 
 
 Using the NHS 2003 and following the methodology described in detail above, 
rates of public health services use for immigrants and locals are calculated and, then, a 
weighted public health spending is imputed to each individual. As it is presented in 
Table 8, according to the data, immigrants receive lower health expenditure than locals, 
but the difference is not significant in statistical terms. With respect to the use of health 
services, only significant divergences are detected for visits to the general practitioner 
and emergency services use, with locals showing slightly higher rates of use.  
 
TABLE 8 HERE 
 
In order to see if the condition of immigrant per se is an explanatory variable of 
the use of health services, we perform a multivariate analysis. As in the previous sub-
section, a tobit model is estimated, although other econometric techniques were also 
used to test the robustness of the results (see Annex II). Variables used in the analysis 
are described in detail in Table A2 in Annex I and the main descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 9.  
 
TABLE 9 HERE 
 
The model formulated here is very similar to the one presented above, but the 
analysis is carried out at an individual level. Imputed public health spending is the 
dependent variable and, apart from the immigrant status, the covariates are a set of need 
variables (self-perceived health status and variables associated with accidents, chronic 
and acute illnesses, smoking, drinking alcohol, practising sport and limitation of 
activity) and several socio-demographic variables (sex, age, age squared, educational 
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level, marital status, main activity status, household income, household size, household 
size squared, number of children in the household, number of earners in the household 
and having or not private insurance).  
The results of the econometric analysis (Table 10) indicate that, once we control 
for age, sex, different variables of health risk and a set of socioeconomic variables of 
the individuals, statistically speaking, immigrants do not consume more health services 
than locals (in addition, though non-significant –p-value is above 0.4-, the marginal 
effect of being immigrant is of only 50€). Furthermore, the application of other 
econometric techniques widely used in health economics, particularly, several sorts of 
two-part models (probit-OLS, probit-log OLS and probit-GLM) do not show different 
results. Therefore, the hypothesis of an over-consumption of health services by 
immigrants should be rejected. 
 
TABLE 10 HERE 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Our aim in this paper has been to deal in a comprehensive way with the topic of 
immigration and Welfare use in Spain. The analysis presented here includes two 
different dimensions: social benefits in cash and use of public health services. By means 
of two representative household surveys, it was found, firstly, that immigrant 
households receive fewer cash transfers than local ones, even after controlling for 
observable characteristics, and this result holds even if pension income is excluded. The 
profile of the Spanish Welfare State, with one of the lowest levels of social spending in 
the EU-15 and its emphasis on contributory benefits, may contribute to explain these 
findings. In the second place, regarding the use of public health services, the results 
presented here have shown that health spending received by immigrants is not 
statistically higher than that allocated to natives. These results do not necessarily imply 
that immigration will not put more pressure on the Spanish Welfare State. It is possible 
that in a few years, when the immigrant population has aged and satisfies to a larger 
extent requirements and eligibility conditions for pensions and unemployment benefits, 
a phenomenon of migrant Welfare dependency will arise. Anyway, because of the scant 
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priority given to means-tested programs by Spanish governments, the relevance of this 
issue would be smaller than in other countries with more generous Welfare regimes.  
 This work also shows several limitations. The most important one is the sample 
sizes of the household surveys used. Although the study uses the most recent and largest 
databases, which are of substantially higher quality than those used in previous 
literature, only a few hundred observations of immigrants are available. Furthermore, 
the definition of immigrant is far from being optimal. As a consequence, this work 
could be extended in several directions. Firstly, the release of new health databases 
(such as the NHS 2006) will make it possible to check the robustness of some of the 
results presented here. In the second place, a separate study on the different 
determinants of the demand of public health services is required in order to better 
understand potential behaviour differences between immigrants and locals. Finally, 
future waves of the EU-SILC will allow studies to be carried out on Welfare recipiency 
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Table 1. Estimates of the take-up rates of social cash benefits and average transfers for locals and immigrants in Spain (2004) 
 % household receiving cash  transfers Average cash transfer received (euros, all households) Average cash transfer received (euros, only recipient households) 
 Total Locals Immigrants Means test Total Locals Immigrants Means test Total Locals Immigrants Means test 
Any social benefit 56.6 57.6 32.4 *** 5,092 5,234 1,787 *** 8,999 9,084 5,512 *** 
Any social benefit (except pensions) 23.2 23.2 23.6  1,040 1,054 712 *** 4,489 4,554 3,018 *** 
Pensions 41.7 43.0 11.3 *** 4,399 4,539 1,168 *** 10,592 10,593 10,484  
Unemployment benefits 11.0 10.9 13.4  409 409 409  3,780 3,817 3,092  
Sickness benefits 3.1 3.2 1.6 *** 132 136 44 *** 4,584 4,615 3,080 ** 
Family assistance 3.0 3.0 3.6  58 58 42  1,910 1,947 1,178 *** 
Social assistance 0.7 0.6 1.4  15 14 31  2,190 2,185 2,250  
Housing 0.8 0.8 1.9  41 40 72  4,880 5,000 3,741  
Scholarships 4.0 4.0 3.9  44 45 24  1,161 633 1,184 * 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
Source: Authors’ analysis from EU-SILC 2005. 
Table 2. Main observable characteristics by immigrant status and welfare recipiency 
 
Any social benefit Any social benefit (except pensions) 
 Locals Immigrants Locals Immigrants 
 Non rec. Rec. Non rec. Rec. Non rec. Rec. Non rec. Rec. 
Household characteristics         
Household size (mean) 3.0 2.7 3.4 3.3 2.7 3.3 3.3 3.5 
Number of children (mean) 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.7 1.0 
Number of earners (mean) 1.7 0.8 1.7 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.6 
H.H. characteristics         
Sex (%)         
Man 75.7 62.9 70.0 75.3 67.9 69.8 69.2 80.0 
Woman 24.3 37.1 30.0 24.7 32.2 30.2 30.9 20.0 
Age group (%)         
25 or under 1.4 0.6 3.9 0.0 0.9 1.1 3.4 0.0 
26 to 45 54.6 18.6 69.1 58.8 31.6 41.5 61.7 78.9 
46 to 60 37.1 21.9 24.7 21.0 25.9 36.6 25.4 17.2 
61 or over 6.9 58.9 2.3 20.2 41.7 20.8 9.4 3.9 
Education (%)         
Elementary 24.7 60.3 24.3 20.0 45.8 43.2 24.7 17.2 
Basic 21.3 13.8 10.8 8.6 16.1 20.0 9.9 10.8 
Intermediate 23.3 12.1 35.5 33.1 16.5 18.0 35.7 31.3 
High 30.7 13.8 29.4 38.3 21.6 18.8 29.7 40.7 
Marital status (%)         
Single 17.4 10.6 27.6 17.4 13.8 12.7 25.6 20.0 
Married 74.4 62.7 58.8 66.5 65.7 74.1 59.9 65.7 
Divorced/separated 6.7 3.8 10.8 10.1 4.8 5.7 10.5 10.9 
Widow/widower 1.5 22.9 2.8 6.0 15.7 7.4 4.0 3.4 
Activity (%)         
Employed 72.6 25.2 79.5 61.7 43.7 50.6 74.8 70.4 
Self-employed 18.7 5.3 11.4 3.3 11.6 8.9 10.3 3.9 
Unemployed 2.8 5.8 5.0 13.0 2.2 12.2 4.5 17.4 
Retired 0.0 44.0 0.0 13.6 29.4 12.0 5.3 1.4 
Other inactivity 5.9 19.7 4.1 8.4 13.1 16.3 5.0 6.9 
         
% of total households 95.9 4.1 95.9 4.1 
% receiving benefits 57.6 32.4 23.2 23.6 
Transfers received (euros) (mean) 5,234 1,787 1,054 712 





Table 3. Determinants of social benefits recipiency in Spain (tobit model) (2004) 
 Coefficients M.E. Coefficients M.E. Coefficients M.E. 
Constant 1658.2 *** 1787.5 ***  -8156.0 ***  
Immigrant (Local = 0) -7710.1 *** -3272.0 *** -3216.3 *** -1600.3 *** -1725.2 ** -970.9 *** 
Household characteristics       
Household size  3934.2 *** 2208.8 *** 4600.5 *** 2768.2 *** 
Household size squared  -47.0  -26.4  -301.8 *** -181.6 *** 
Number of children  -5889.1 *** -3306.3 *** -2402.4 *** -1445.6 *** 
Number of earners  -7331.5 *** -4116.1 *** -2388.4 *** -1437.2 *** 
Household head characteristics       
Women (man = 0)    -330.9  -198.2  
Age of household head (61 or more = 0)       
25 or under   -4930.0 *** -2375.7 *** 
26 to 45   -3666.0 *** -2106.1 *** 
46 to 60   -2648.6 *** -1517.8 *** 
Marital status (married = 0)      
Single   2052.9 *** 1307.3 *** 
Divorced/separated   -46.7  -28.0  
Widow/widower   2701.6 *** 1751.1 *** 
Education (Elementary = 0)      
Basic   1056.7 *** 653.7 *** 
Intermediate   1553.3 *** 972.0 *** 
High   2481.2 *** 1575.9 *** 
Activity (Employed = 0)     
Self-employed  -882.3  -516.0 * 
Unemployed  5315.2 *** 3768.9 *** 
Retired  11857.1 *** 8541.8 *** 
Other inactivity  7042.8 *** 5023.5 *** 
    
R2 0.01 0.29 0.44 
Wald χ  83.23*** 1,501.2*** 2,050.1*** 
Observations 12,661 12,661 12,661 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 








Table 4. Determinants of social benefits recipiency (apart from pensions) (tobit model) in Spain (2004) 
 Coefficients M.E. Coefficients M.E. Coefficients M.E. 
Constant -7,247.3 *** -15,752.5 ***  -17,442.7 *** 
Immigrant (Local = 0) -517.4 -109.5 -736.1  -145.5  -1,822.6 ** -341.1 *** 
Household characteristics      
Household size 4,686.1 *** 974.7 *** 4,433.8 *** 947.4 *** 
Household size squared -381.8 *** -79.4 *** -340.9 *** -72.8 *** 
Number of children -263.8  -54.9  -1,115.5 *** -238.3 *** 
Number of earners -930.3 *** -193.5 *** -786.2 *** -168.0 *** 
Household head characteristics    
Women (man = 0) -1,686.9 *** -343.7 *** 
Age of household head (61 or more = 0)    
25 or under 2,622.5 ** 682.0 * 
26 to 45 4,052.3 *** 957.8 *** 
46 to 60 2,927.0 *** 693.1 *** 
Marital status (married = 0)    
Single 1,941.4 *** 462.7 *** 
Divorced/separated 1,659.6 *** 397.9 *** 
Widow/widower -774.8  -158.3  
Education (Elementary = 0)    
Basic -662.5 * -136.7 * 
Intermediate -925.6 ** -188.7 ** 
High -854.0 ** -175.7 ** 
Activity (Employed = 0)    
Self-employed -1,756.6 *** -336.8 *** 
Unemployed 7,625.3 *** 2,675.0 *** 
Retired -775.1  -160.6  
Other inactivity 4,939.3 *** 1,390.9 *** 
    
R2 0.00 0.02 0.07 
Wald test  ** *** 
Observations 12,661 12,661 12,661 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 




Table 5. Main observable characteristics by immigrant status and unemployment benefits and pensions recipiency 
 
Unemployment benefits Pensions 
 Locals Immigrants Locals Immigrants 
 Non rec. Rec. Non rec. Rec. Non rec. Rec. Non rec. Rec. 
Personal characteristics         
Sex (%)         
Man 48.8 48.7 47.9 61.2 47.7 52.6 48.6 49.0 
Woman 51.2 51.3 52.1 38.9 52.3 47.4 51.4 51.1 
Age group (%)         
25 or under 13.4 6.2 17.5 2.0 16.4 0.9 17.5 0.0 
26 to 45 37.1 58.3 58.0 82.9 47.9 3.5 62.2 5.9 
46 to 60 22.2 28.4 17.0 15.1 25.9 10.5 17.0 14.3 
61 or over 27.2 7.1 7.5 0.0 9.7 85.2 3.4 79.7 
Education (%)         
Elementary 38.7 35.6 23.5 15.7 28.0 76.3 21.9 46.7 
Basic 19.7 27.5 16.9 9.6 23.2 8.7 17.1 4.7 
Intermediate 20.1 19.1 34.5 32.7 23.7 7.0 34.2 38.8 
High 21.6 17.8 25.1 42.0 25.1 8.0 26.9 9.7 
Marital status (%)         
Single 30.2 28.5 34.9 32.0 35.9 9.6 36.2 6.5 
Married 58.7 65.4 54.7 59.3 60.2 54.9 55.5 45.8 
Divorced/separated 2.9 5.1 6.5 4.2 3.3 2.0 6.2 10.5 
Widow/widower 8.2 1.0 3.9 4.6 0.6 33.6 2.2 37.3 
Work experience 17.9 17.6 13.3 15.9 13.9 32.0 12.8 26.7 
Household characteristics         
Household size (mean) 3.3 3.4 3.8 3.4 3.5 2.5 3.8 3.0 
Number of children (mean) 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.2 
Number of earners (mean) 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.6 1.7 0.5 1.9 0.8 
    
% of total population 95.8 4.2 95.8 4.2 
% receiving benefits 5.2 5.7 21.8 4.9 




Table 6. Determinants of unemployment insurance dependency in Spain (probit model) (2004) 
 Coefficients M.E. (%) Coefficients M.E. (%) Coefficients M.E. (%) 
Constant -1.630 *** -1.403    -1.366 ***  
Immigrant (Local = 0) 0.045 0.5 -0.033  -0.3 -0.010  -0.1  
Personal characteristics          
Sex (Man = 0)     0.087 ** 0.8 ** 0.093 ** 0.8 ** 
Age (26 to 45 = 0)          
25 or under     -0.533 *** -3.3 *** -0.514 *** -3.2 *** 
46 to 60     -0.248 *** -1.9 *** -0.258 *** -2.0 *** 
61 or over     -0.970 *** -6.0 *** -1.097 *** -6.6 *** 
Education (Elementary = 0)          
Basic     -0.029  -0.2 -0.015  -0.1  
Intermediate     -0.211 *** -1.6 *** -0.193 *** -1.5 *** 
High     -0.312 *** -2.3 *** -0.284 *** -2.2 *** 
Marital status (Married = 0)          
Single     0.024  0.2 0.030  0.3  
Divorced/separated     0.129 * 1.2 * 0.100  0.9  
Widow/widower     -0.511 *** -3.1 *** -0.511 *** -3.1 *** 
Work experience     0.007 *** 0.1 *** 0.009 *** 0.1 *** 
Household characteristics             
Household size         0.056  0.5  
Household size squared         -0.005  0.0  
Number of children         -0.015  -0.1  
Number of earners         -0.117 *** -1.0 *** 
    
Mc Fadden R2 0.00 0.06 0.07 
Wald χ  0.3 449.3*** 465.2*** 
Observations 29,203 29,203 29,203 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 











Table 7. Determinants of pensions dependency in Spain (probit model) (2004) 
 Coefficients M.E. (%) Coefficients M.E. (%) Coefficients M.E. (%) 
Constant -0.777 ***  -0.634 ***  -0.595 ***   
Immigrant (Local = 0) -0.875 *** -16.9 *** -0.366 *** -7.1 *** -0.398 *** -5.4 *** 
Personal characteristics          
Sex (Man = 0)   -0.093  -6.2  -0.104  -5.5  
Age (26 to 45 = 0)         
25 or under   0.489 *** -1.5 *** 0.351 *** -1.3 *** 
46 to 60   2.111 *** 9.7 *** 1.625 *** 5.5 *** 
61 or over   -0.287 *** 57.0 *** -0.217 *** 37.0 *** 
Education (Elementary = 0)         
Basic   -0.279 *** -4.3 *** -0.182 *** -2.7 *** 
Intermediate   -0.395 *** -4.2 *** -0.260 *** -2.3 *** 
High   0.610 *** -5.7 *** 0.537 *** -3.2 *** 
Marital status (Married = 0)         
Single   0.339 *** 12.0 *** 0.340 *** 8.6 *** 
Divorced/separated   2.146 *** 6.9 *** 2.423 *** 5.8 *** 
Widow/widower   0.023 *** 67.7 *** 0.029 *** 73.1 *** 
Work experience   -2.310 *** 0.4 *** 0.241 *** 0.4 *** 
Household characteristics         
Household size   -0.005  3.3  
Household size squared   -0.245 *** -0.1 *** 
Number of children   -0.647 *** -3.3 *** 
Number of earners   -2.171 *** -8.8 *** 
    
Mc Fadden R2 0.09 0.59 0.64 
Wald test *** *** *** 
Observations 29,203 29,203 29,203 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 




Table 8.  Use of health services by locals and immigrants (2003) 
 Total Locals Immigrants Means test 
Average total expenditure (euros) 852 857 714  
Visits to the general practitioner 7.45 7.53 4.99 *** 
Visits to the specialist 2.97 2.98 2.54  
Days of hospitalization 0.87 0.87 0.77  
Emergency room visits 0.44 0.44 0.37 ** 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 




Table 9. Main observable characteristics by immigrant status and public health spending recipiency 
 Locals Immigrants 
 Non rec. Rec. Non rec. Rec. 
Need variables     
Sex (%)     
Man 61.1 46.5 62.6 45.2 
Woman 38.9 53.5 37.4 54.8 
Age (mean) 35.6 41.1 28.8 28.5 
Health status (%)     
Very good 22.8 10.9 22.0 15.8 
Good 69.4 55.0 72.9 59.8 
Not bad 7.0 24.6 4.6 21.7 
Bad 0.8 7.2 0.5 2.2 
Very bad 0.1 2.4 0.0 0.6 
Accidents (%) 2.8 11.7 0.0 11.0 
Chronic illnesses (%) 19.5 49.2 12.1 24.6 
Acute illnesses (%) 5.2 26.6 3.5 22.4 
Limitation of activity (last year) (%) 5.9 16.6 7.3 15.2 
Limitation of activity (2 weeks) (%) 4.0 18.5 1.9 6.9 
Smoker (%) 33.7 24.9 25.0 19.2 
Alcohol (%) 17.7 14.4 7.5 5.1 
Sport (%) 47.8 44.2 39.6 39.8 
Socio-demographic variables     
Personal variables     
Education (%)     
Elementary 34.0 47.2 30.9 37.6 
Basic 19.6 19.3 16.5 14.0 
Intermediate 26.4 21.1 35.1 31.3 
High 20.0 12.4 17.5 17.1 
Marital status (%)     
Single 50.1 41.4 53.3 54.1 
Married 45.3 49.1 44.4 39.9 
Divorced/separated 2.3 2.2 2.2 4.1 
Widow/widower 2.3 7.3 0.0 1.8 
Activity (%)     
Aged 16 or under 11.4 16.4 11.5 21.2 
Employed 55.6 35.8 65.3 49.8 
Unemployed 6.1 4.9 6.4 6.0 
Retired 6.5 18.8 0.5 2.4 
Other inactivity 20.5 24.2 16.3 20.7 
Household variables     
Household size (mean) 3.8 3.5 4.5 4.3 
Number of children (mean) 0.7 0.6 1.1 1.1 
Number of earners (mean) 1.6 1.3 2.3 1.9 
Log household income (mean) 10.0 9.9 10.1 10.0 
Private insurance (%) 20.6 11.1 14.3 4.7 
     
% of total population 96.8 3.2 
% receiving health spending 81.4 79.1 
Health spending received (euros) (mean) 857 714 
Source: Authors’ analysis from NHS 2003. 
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Table 10. Determinants of health care expenditure in Spain (tobit model) (2003) 
 Coefficients M.E. Coefficients M.E. Coefficients M.E. 
Constant 410.0 ***   336.1 ***   -967.8   
Immigrant (Local = 0) -211.5 * -113.8 * 118.3  62.4  97.6  52.3  
Need variables          
Women (Man = 0)     81.4  42.4  119.2 * 63.2 * 
Age     -42.9 *** -22.3 *** -38.5 *** -20.4 *** 
Age squared     0.5 *** 0.2 *** 0.3 *** 0.2 *** 
Health status (Good = 0)     -331.0 *** -166.8 ***    
Very good     476.0 *** 256.4 *** -292.2 *** -150.7 *** 
Not bad     1691.0 *** 1044.7 *** 441.0 *** 241.3 *** 
Bad     3315.3 *** 2363.4 *** 1639.4 *** 1023.9 *** 
Very bad     775.5 *** 435.7 *** 3238.6 *** 2324.7 *** 
Accidents     430.9 *** 226.0 *** 798.4 *** 457.4 *** 
Chronic illnesses     1213.8 *** 685.5 *** 420.2 *** 224.4 *** 
Acute illnesses     448.5 *** 243.0 *** 1220.3 *** 701.4 *** 
Limitation of activity (last year)     21.7  11.3  444.7 *** 245.2 *** 
Limitation of activity (2 weeks)     -128.0 ** -66.1 ** -9.6  -5.1  
Smoker     -99.9  -51.5  -106.9 * -56.3 * 
Alcohol     -127.3 *** -66.1 *** -119.1 * -62.4 * 
Sport       -106.7 ** -56.5 ** 
Socio-demographic variables          
Personal variables          
Education (Elementary = 0)          
Basic       76.5  40.8  
Intermediate        68.2  36.3  
High        102.3  54.7  
Marital status (Married = 0)           
Single        312.6 *** 166.0 *** 
Divorced/separated        355.9 *** 196.8 *** 
Widow/widower        320.9 * 176.2 * 
Activity (Employed = 0)           
Under 16 years old        198.0  106.8  
Unemployed        -48.6  -25.6  
Retired        606.8 *** 338.5 *** 
Other inactivity        89.7  47.9  
Household variables           
Household size         -46.8  -24.8  
Household size squared         0.9  0.5  
Number of children        7.6  4.0  
Number of earners        -81.1 * -43.0 * 
Household income         144.9  76.8  
Private insurance         -793.4 *** -388.8 *** 
    
R2 0.00 0.12 0.13 
Wald test * ** ** 
Observations 27,075 27,075 27,075 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 




Table A1. Description of the variables used in cash transfers regressions 
Variable Description 
Social benefits Continuous variable: State income transfers (euros) received by the household in 2004. 
UB recipient Dummy variable: Unemployment benefit recipient (0=No; 1=Yes). 
Pension recipient Dummy variable: Pension recipient (0=No; 1=Yes). 
Household size Count variable: Number of people living in the household. 
Household size squared Count variable: Number of people living in the household squared. 
Number of earners Count variable: Number of people earning labour income in the household. 
Number of children Count variable: Number of children aged 14 or under in the household. 
Household head Dummy variable: If the individual is the head of the household (0=No; 1=Yes). 
Sex Dummy variable: Sex of the individual (0=Man; 1=Woman). 
Age 
Three dummy variables: Age of the individual (25 or under, 46-60, 61 and over; omitted 
category=26-45). Dummy variables are used because the age variable in the EU-SILC is top-
coded at 80. 
Marital status Four dummy variables: Marital status of the individual (Single, Widowed, Separated or Divorced; omitted category=Married). 
Education Three dummy variables: Educational level of the individual (Basic, Medium, High; omitted category=Elementary). 
Activity status Three dummy variables: Main economic activity status of the individual in 2004 (Self-employed, Unemployed, Retired, Other inactivity; omitted category=Employed). 
Work experience Continuous variable: Number of years worked. 
Immigrant Dummy variable: Immigrant status (0=Local; 1=Immigrant). 
HH sex Dummy variable: Sex of the household head (0=Man; 1=Woman). 
HH age 
Three dummy variables: Age of the household head (25 or under, 26-45, 46-60; omitted 
category=61 and over). A continuous variable is not used because the variable “age” in the EU-
SILC is top coded at 80. 
HH marital status Four dummy variables: Marital status of the household head (Married, Widowed, Separated or Divorced; omitted category=Single). 
HH education Three dummy variables: educational level of the household head (Basic, Medium, High; omitted category=Elementary). 
HH immigrant Dummy variable: Immigrant status of the household head (0=Local; 1=Immigrant). 




Table A2. Description of the variables used in the public health care spending regressions 
Variable Description 
HC expenditure Continuous variable: Public health care expenditure received by the individual. 
Health status Four dummy variables: Health self-perception (Good, Regular, Bad, Very Bad; omitted category=Very Good).  
Accidents Dummy variables: Having suffered an accident in the last year (0=No; 1=Yes). 
Chronic illnesses Dummy variable: Having suffered a chronic illness in the last year (0=No; 1=Yes). 
Acute illnesses Dummy variable: Having suffered an acute illness in the last two weeks (0=No; 1=Yes). 
Limitation of activity (last 
year) 
Dummy variable: Limitation of the individual activity for more than ten days by an acute illness 
in the last year (0=No; 1=Yes). 
Limitation of activity (last two 
weeks) Dummy variable: Limitation of the individual activity in the last two weeks (0=No; 1=Yes). 
Smoker Dummy variable: Smoking (0=No; 1=Yes). 
Alcohol Dummy variable: Drinking alcoholic drinks daily (0=No; 1=Yes). 
Sport Dummy variable: Performing physical exercise daily (0=No; 1=Yes). 
Sex Dummy variable: Sex of the individual (0=Man; 1=Woman). 
Age Continuous variable: Age of the individual. 
Age squared Continuous variable: Age of the individual squared/100. 
Marital status Four dummy variables: Marital status of the individual (Married, Widowed, Legally Separated, Divorced; omitted category=Single). 
Education 
Three dummy variables: Educational level of the individual (Basic, Medium, High; omitted 
category=Elementary). If the individual is under 16 years old, the educational level of the 
household is reported. 
Income Continuous variable: Ln of equivalised household income/1000. 
Activity status Four dummy variables: Activity of the individual (Employed, Unemployed, Retired, Other type of inactivity; omitted category=individuals aged under 16). 
Household size Count variable: Number of people living in the household. 
Household size squared Count variable: Number of people living in the household squared. 
Number of earners Count variable: Number of people earning labour income in the household. 
Number of children Count variable: Number of children aged 14 or under in the household. 
Private insurance Dummy variable: Having a private health insurance plan (0=No; 1=Yes). 





Table A3. Determinants of health care expenditure in Spain (several specifications) (2003) 
 Probit OLS Log OLS GLM 
 Coefficients M.E. (%) Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
Constant 2.184 ***  -1091.6  6.332 *** 6.303 *** 
Immigrant (Local = 0) 0.081  2.1  24.4  0.027  0.119  
Need variables       
Women (Man = 0) 0.312 *** 8.2 *** -131.2 ** 0.008  -0.056 * 
Age -0.045 *** -1.2 *** -14.6 * -0.024 *** -0.026 *** 
Age squared 0.000 *** 0.0 *** 0.1  0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Health status (Good = 0)       
Very good -0.246 *** -7.0 *** -30.8  -0.122 *** -0.091 ** 
Not bad 0.392 *** 9.3 *** 240.1 *** 0.262 *** 0.281 *** 
Bad 0.524 *** 11.0 *** 1494.8 *** 0.539 *** 0.759 *** 
Very bad 0.797 *** 14.0 *** 3079.5 *** 0.696 *** 1.061 *** 
Accidents 0.776 *** 14.9 *** 441.0 *** 0.192 *** 0.312 *** 
Chronic illnesses 0.535 *** 13.6 *** -3.0  0.194 *** 0.180 *** 
Acute illnesses 0.582 *** 13.1 *** 970.4 *** 0.446 *** 0.807 *** 
Limitation of activity (last year) 0.139 *** 3.5 *** 404.2 *** 0.507 *** 0.457 *** 
Limitation of activity (2 weeks) -0.123 * -3.4 * 128.2  -0.013  -0.005  
Smoker -0.011  -0.3  -120.0 * -0.067 *** -0.089 ** 
Alcohol -0.106 *** -2.9 *** -66.1  -0.038  -0.049  
Sport 0.050 * 1.3 * -163.9 *** -0.054 *** -0.114 *** 
Socio-demographic variables       
Personal variables       
Education (Elementary = 0)       
Basic 0.052  1.3  37.5  0.073 *** 0.035  
Intermediate 0.073 * 1.9 * 5.1  0.050 * 0.009  
High 0.063  1.6  85.6  0.029  0.039  
Marital status (Married = 0)       
Single 0.289 *** 7.6 *** 80.4  0.218 *** 0.213 *** 
Divorced/separated 0.168 ** 4.1 ** 209.9  0.262 *** 0.255 ** 
Widow/widower 0.056  1.4  276.6  0.125 ** 0.172 ** 
Activity (Employed = 0)       
Under 16 years old 0.151 * 3.8 * -61.4  0.086  0.034  
Unemployed -0.048  -1.3  -64.0  0.058  0.085  
Retired 0.092  2.4  490.8 *** 0.234 *** 0.282 *** 
Other inactivity 0.005  0.1  59.9  0.112 *** 0.145 *** 
Household variables       
Number of children 0.074 * 2.0 * -120.0  -0.065 ** -0.077 ** 
Number of earners -0.010 ** -0.3 ** 10.6  0.006 * 0.004  
Household size -0.037  -1.0  42.4  0.009  0.054 * 
Household size squared -0.018  -0.5  -82.2 * 0.007  -0.008  
Household income -0.121 ** -3.2 ** 236.7 * -0.022  0.042  
Private insurance -0.472 *** -14.4 *** -482.5 *** -0.747 *** -0.623 *** 
          
R2 0.17 0.11 0.27  
Wald test *** *** ***  
AIC    15.35 
Observations 27,075 22,658 22,658 22,658 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
Source: Authors’ analysis from NHS 2003. 
 
